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A multivariate study of over-indebtedness’ causes and consequences 
Abstract 
This paper proposes a comprehensive explanatory model to explain both causes and consequences of 
over-indebtedness. It presents as causes some borrower aspects, such as propensity to indebtedness and low 
financial literacy. Other causes are borrower circumstances: adverse external shocks, borrower internal problems 
and financial institutions’ pressure. The model incorporates consequences on the borrower, the lender and the 
society. The model has been tested with a survey filled in by experts and over-indebted individuals. Results have 
been analyzed using multivariate techniques, including canonical correlations. There are differences in the 
opinions of experts and individuals: the latter blame external shocks or financial institutions’ pressure, while the 
former find relevant factors the financial illiteracy or the tendency to imitate others. Experts and individuals 
agree on the consequences: poverty growth in the society and declining borrower’s welfare. The paper concludes 
with the need to improve financial literacy, especially in the risks involved in over-indebtedness. 
Keywords: Over-indebtedness, financial literacy, financial crisis, canonical correlations. 
1. Introduction
An over-indebted household is defined as one whose existing and foreseeable resources are insufficient to 
meet its financial commitments without lowering its living standards (Brennan and Gallagher, 2007). Over-
indebtedness is a major problem that affects both borrowers and financial institutions, and even the whole 
society (European Commision, 2013). Over-indebtedness can be a major factor in creating poverty, particularly 
among low-income, old age households and single-parent households with young children (Betti et al, 2007). 
Besides, over-indebtedness can lead financial institutions to bankruptcy (Lascelles and Mendelson, 2012). 
Different authors have studied over-indebtedness under different approaches: drivers of over-indebtedness 
(Disney et al., 2008), the consequences of debt excess (Porter, 2012), the role of financial literacy (Gathergood, 
2012), or psychological aspects (Lea et al, 1995). A number of empirical studies have been performed (Betti et al, 
2007; Dickerson, 2008; and Schicks, 2014). Past research efforts are based on surveys which asked or experts or 
over-indebted individuals, but much can be learned by asking both experts and consumers, identifying 
differences between them. Although many studies analyze drivers and consequences of over-indebtedness, a 
comprehensive model is needed, relating both aspects, which motivates the present paper. 
The first research question is to propose and test a model integrating both over-indebtedness causes and 
consequences, allowing us to study the relationship between them. Traditional theoretical models explaining 
over-indebtedness were based on economic theory and hypotheses on the rationale of decision makers, such as 
the Life-Cycle-Permanent Income theory (Ando and Modigliani, 1963). More recent models are improved by 
psychological theories, linked to behavioral economics (Loewenstein et al., 2003). This paper follows the 
rationalism and behaviorism philosophy by Ortega-y-Gasset (1961) proposing two kinds of causes: those linked 
to the individual, such as the lack of financial literacy or his willingness to be in debt; and those based on 
circumstances, such as external crises or the pressure put on by financial institutions. The consequences include 
the effect on individuals, financial entities and the whole of society. This is a holistic framework, integrating 
most of the causes and consequences mentioned in over-indebtedness literature. Most of the studies on over-
indebtedness are based on regressions, taking a measure of indebtedness as a dependent variable (Schicks, 2014). 
The statistical technique used in this paper is canonical correlations, a technique suitable for a set of independent 
variables (causes) and a set of dependent variables (consequences). To the best of our knowledge, there are no 
previous studies like the one presented here, which constitutes a contribution to the literature. 
The second research question is to identify the causes and consequences of over-indebtedness which are 
more important. Most of the studies survey individuals (Betti et al 2007; Gathergood, 2012; and Schicks, 2014), 
but some of them survey experts (Kilborn, 2011). The study also aims at identifying different perceptions in over-
indebtedness consequences among individuals and experts. The same survey has been filled in by a sample of 
individuals and a sample of experts, and it has been analyzed using different methodologies, including a means 
test and multivariate techniques. This is another contribution of this study. 
The empirical study has been performed in Spain, where the financial crisis hit hard, with a high number 
of people who cannot meet their financial commitments. Overindebtedness from mortgages was considered one 
of the main troubles for Spaniards (Martín and García, 2016). The financial crisis provoked the rescue of the 
damaged banking sector, the credit tap being turned off, and housing evictions enforced. There have even been 
political consequences: the founder of the Spanish Mortgage Victims Platform has been recently elected as 
mayor of Barcelona. Differences are found in the opinions of experts and individuals. Individuals blame external 
shocks or financial institutions’ pressure, while they find financial illiteracy or financial attitudes less important 
than experts do. Impoverishment in society and worsened individual welfare are the more remarkable over-
indebtedness consequences, among the data analyzed. The diagnosis of the consequences is similar for experts 
and individuals. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review and hypothesis 
development. Section 3 presents the empirical study. Finally, conclusions are presented.  
2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
A number of economic theories explain over-indebtedness. The Life-Cycle-Permanent Income theory analyzes 
the spending and saving habits of people over their life arguing that individuals choose to maintain stable lifestyles 
(Ando and Modigliani, 1963). Indebtedness is a planned and rational decision that allows inter-temporal redistribution 
of consumption. The Behavioral-Life-Cycle theory theory affirms that individuals often do not think about spending 
and loan decisions using discount rates, but through mental accounting - the real way people treat financial events 
(Shefrin and Thaler, 1988). This way consumption plans are affected by a lack of self-control, usually ignored in 
economic analysis, which really influence human behavior. 
Behavioral approaches have become one of the mainstream approaches to explain over-indebtedness, supported 
by the research of psychologists. According to the Projection Bias theory, people tend to underappreciate the effects of 
changes in their states, and hence falsely project their current preferences over consumption into their future preferences 
(Loewenstein et al., 2003). Prospect theory concludes that people are not consistently risk-averse: they are risk-averse 
in gains but risk-takers in losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), which can explain over-indebtedness. Several studies 
have found that people tend to overestimate the precision of their knowledge, generating overconfidence and debt (Bird 
et al, 2014). 
The theory of decision making has become a meeting place for psychological and economic theory 
(Simon, 1956). The conceptual framework of our paper is rooted in both behaviorism and rationalism. The proposed 
model (Figure 1) follows Ortega-y-Gasset (1961) formula: “I am myself plus my circumstance”. Circumstance 
includes material things, people, society, and culture. Some circumstances favor over-indebtedness, such as the 
external pressure by financial institutions, or the environment that pushes people towards debt. This situation can 
be worsened by external factors, such as country general crises or unexpected personal situations, such as 
unemployment. As for the individuals, some of them can have a propensity for debt and an inadequate 
perception of risk. The lack of financial literacy is also associated to over-indebtedness. As for over-
indebtedness consequences, the effects on debtors, financial institutions and society are remarkable. The 
borrower is affected in psychological and material aspects. The lender is affected by write-offs that worsen its 
financial performance; and it also suffers from reputational losses. The whole of society can receive a negative 
impact from an economic point of view, as well as from low social cohesion and high poverty levels. 
[Figure_1] 
External adverse shocks 
Unexpected macroeconomic shocks are a major driver of over‐indebtedness according to the Life-Cycle-
Permanent Income theory (Betti et al, 2007). In fact, the only explanation of over‐indebtedness that is consistent with 
this rational model is unexpected adverse shocks to the consumer’s expenditure requirements. The institutional and 
legal environment can increase or reduce the risks of over-indebtedness (Schicks 2014). For example, in the 
Spanish case, non-recourse debt does not exist, so if the borrower defaults, the fact of giving the house back to 
the bank does not cancel the debt. 
An important aspect is the growing importance of external factors as over-indebtedness drivers, in 
detriment of recognizing debtors’ own responsibilities. In a study about popular media, representations of 
debtors from the last 150 years indicated that popular culture has changed, with people coming to see debt problems 
not as resulting from moral depravity but as understandable caused by external factors such as market shifts, 
unemployment, illness, and so on (Efrat, 2006). Another study indicated that structural conditions such as financial 
deregulation or aggressive marketing banking campaigns lead to a culture hospitable to over-indebtedness (Braucher, 
2006). 
Internal adverse shocks 
Income falls due to negative personal circumstances, such as unemployment, illness or unexpected 
expenses may cause over-indebtedness (Gathergood, 2012; Kempson, 2002). Internal structural factors include 
family break-up and a lack of health insurance (Braucher, 2006). The Life-Cycle-Permanent Income theory supports 
this reasoning: although the presence of mechanisms to cover these critical incidents, such as insurance, social safety 
networks or family support, such mechanisms do not always work and over‐indebtedness can arise (Betti et al. 2007). 
Kamleitner and Kirchler (2007) review the literature on critical life events causing over‐indebtedness, concluding that 
over‐indebtedness is mainly determined by financially relevant life events such as job loss or divorce.  
Financial institutions’ pressure 
Different situations favor the idea of considering financial entities as drivers of over-indebtedness. During 
the expansionary phase of a cycle, banks’ lending standards are relaxed and bad loans could probably be 
allocated (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006). These authors present a theoretical model that provides an 
explanation for the following sequence: financial liberalization, lending booms, and banking crises. Their model 
can also explain why financially excluded people have moved from the lack of credit to over-indebtedness. 
Lascelles and Mendelson (2012) and Garðarsdóttir and Dittmar (2012) directly blame financial institutions of 
competitive pressure leading to irresponsible lending and over-indebtedness. Braucher (2006) highlights the lack 
of financial regulation and creditors’ sophisticated marketing, and high-pressure loan collection techniques. Another 
study finds evidence of irresponsible lending practices associated with over-indebtedness by offering low initial 
interest rates and higher credit limits (Kempson, 2002). 
Financial illiteracy  
The low financial literacy level, the lack of abilities and the lack of experience to manage money are proposed as 
over-indebtedeness drivers in the literature (Disney et al. 2008, Townley-Jones et al. 2008, Agnew and Cameron-
Agnew 2015). Both the Consumption Function theory (Friedman, 1957) and the Life-Cycle-Permanent Income theory 
(Ando and Modigliani, 1963) have been used as a theoretical support. These economic theories state that a well-
informed individual will consume less than his income in times of high earnings, with the aim of supporting 
consumption when income falls. A bad-informed individual will take wrong decisions, one of them, incurring debt 
beyond his means. 
The relationship between illiteracy and over-indebtedness has been empirically tested in several studies. Illiterate 
people do not only take on loans beyond their means, but also they pay more (Disney and Gathergood, 2013). An 
empirical study that includes economic, educative and psychological variables finds that poor money 
management seems to be especially important (Lea el al, 1995). However, another study finds that financial 
literacy is a secondary concern when it comes to decision making (Hung et al., 2009). 
Propensity to indebtedness 
Tendency to imitate others overlooking the risks involved in lending, and borrowers’ materialism are 
financial attitudes that derive partially from each one’s underlying preferences. Behavioural Economics and 
Psychology go beyond economic theories and identify several bias, such as an overconfidence bias, inter-
temporal balancing of utility, locus of control, or habit persistence, among others (Schicks, 2014). The Prospect 
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) help to explain behaviors such as addiction to and excessive pursuit of a high 
material standard of living; and they can also explain over-borrowing. Over-indebtedness occurs more frequently 
among individuals who report self-control problems, who are also more likely to suffer adverse financial shocks 
(Gathergood, 2012). There is a clear evidence of borrowers acting irresponsibly: they borrow money when 
experiencing financial difficulties to pay off other credits or other commitments (Kempson, 2002). 
A person with high materialistic values believes that the acquisition of material goods is a main life goal. 
Materialism is a stronger predictor of the amount of debt instead of income or money-management skills (Garðarsdóttir 
and Dittmar, 2012). In a study about the role of social support for debt, an important factor in predicting debt status was 
whether individuals knew other people around them who were in debt (Lea et al., 1995). In other cases, the family 
context influences financial attitudes, finding that people’s information on how their parents use credit correlated with 
their own ability to use credit successfully (Tokunaga, 1993). 
Consequences on borrowers 
There are economic consequences of over-indebtedness, such as lower consumption level (Betti et al., 
2007), or sacrifices even reducing basic consumer goods (Brett, 2006) that can lead to poverty (Kempson, 2002 
and Porter, 2012). A deteriorated credit history can imply complete exclusion from credit (Lyons and Fisher, 
2006). There are also psychological effects, such as a fear of regret, the distress for having made errors and the 
mental suffering experienced facing the evidence that beliefs have been wrong (Shiller, 1995). Financial 
difficulties drive to family conflicts that, in cases of delinquency and default, are more harmful (Kempson, 
2002). Over-indebtedness represents a principle of social exclusion that can lead to loss of reputation, 
humiliation, and in extreme cases, into suicide (Schicks 2014). 
Consequences on financial institutions 
Consequences on financial institutions have both an economic and an intangible nature. Borrower’s over-
indebtedness affects lenders when it reaches the stage of delinquency. Financial institutions not only get less 
profit, but they also increase their probability of default. Empirical studies provide some support for the view 
that faster loan growth leads to higher loan losses (Serrano-Cinca et al., 2014). It has been so since the origins of 
banking: the failure of the powerful Florentine banks in the 14th century was caused by overextension of credit 
(De Roover, 1963). 
The risk of default can potentially reduce financial system stability and can have a contagious effect 
among other banks. There is also a loss of reputation in the banking industry, which is very important since this 
business is based on depositors’ trust, and a loss of reputation can lead to a panic run. A clear case of reputation 
losses happened in the microfinance industry: since over-indebted borrowers do not pay back, microfinance 
institutions drifted from their social mission, and charged high interest rates (Schicks, 2014). 
Consequences on the society 
Over-indebtedness can lead to important negative effects on the whole of society, such as poverty growth, 
low social cohesion, loss of confidence in the financial industry and reductions in the loan offer, even for solvent 
borrowers. Over-indebtedness leads to social exclusion, because debt burdens may inhibit the consumption that 
is often a required component in everyday social activities (Porter, 2012). The stigma of over-indebtedness may 
eventually affect, not only the delinquent borrower, but it also reduces social trust and mutual support in the 
community, eroding social networks (Schicks, 2014). 
3 Empirical study 
The empirical study is based in Spain, one of the countries where the 2008-2014 financial crisis hit more 
severely. According to the 2014 Survey on Living Conditions by the Spanish Statistical Office, 10.2% of the 
Spanish households have experienced arrears in their payments related to their home, such as mortgage, rent, 
utility bills, or condo fees. According to the 2014 Survey on Migrations by the Spanish Statistical Office, the net 
balance from the beginning of the crisis was 524,880 Spanish persons leaving the country, contrasting with the 
net migration balance of 310,641 foreigners entering the country only in 2008. According to the Spanish Central 
Bank, the number of bank employees reduced from 278,301 in 2008 to 217,885 to 2013. In 2014, the country 
experienced some recovery, with a positive GNP growth. 
The analysis was based on a survey to both experts and individuals. The experts’ sample contains financial 
specialists from the academia and from the business sector. To build the individuals sample we contacted 3 
consumer financial services associations, and one agreed to collaborate in the study: the Spanish Mortgage 
Victims Association. The individuals sample consists of people experiencing problems with their mortgage 
payments and under the threat of eviction. The surveys were filled in in November 2014 and the study was 
performed right afterwards. The sample has 122 surveys: 61 experts based and 61 individual based. 
Table 1 shows the survey items. They are 36 questions using a 7-point Likert scale. The questions’ choice 
was based on the studies by Betti et al (2007), Gathergood (2012), Disney and Gathergood (2013), and Schicks 
(2014). Internal consistency was ensured by analyzing the relationships between each construct and its 
indicators. Content validity, unidimensionality, reliability, convergent validity and discriminant validity were 
ensured to assess psychometric properties for scales used in the study. 
[Table_1] 
Table 2 shows mean and standard deviation for both experts and individuals. An independent-samples t-
test was conducted to compare experts’ opinions to individuals’ opinions. There are statistically significant 
differences. For individuals, the most important factor explaining over-indebtedness is external adverse shocks, 
such as an economic crisis, with an average of 6.03, facing an experts’ average of 3.56. Differences were 
statistically significant. As for internal adverse shocks, such as unemployment or business closure, it is an 
important factor for individuals, 5.74, and less important for experts, 5.02. Differences were statistically 
significant. Financial institutions’ pressure, especially in loan allocation for everyone, was considered an 
important factor for individuals, 5.82 and not so important for experts, 4.10. Differences were statistically 
significant. It can be interpreted that individuals blame circumstances more than experts do.  
The opinions on the role played by financial literacy differ from individuals to experts. Experts find it an 
important over-indebtedness driver. This way, the lack of money management skills reaches a 5.07 for experts, 
while reaching a 4.05 for individuals. Differences were statistically significant. Propensity to over-indebtedness 
is an important driver and both groups agree. The idea that borrowers do not think about the risks involved in 
debt reaches a 5.56 for experts and 5.25 for individuals. Differences were not statistically significant. 
Differences arise in the tendency to imitate others: to have goods, to own a business or to be successful. This 
factor is considered more important for experts (5.25) than for individuals (4.00), and differences are statistically 
significant. It can be interpreted that, assuming than experts’ opinions are well rooted, individuals are not 
consistently assuming their part of the responsibility. 
[Table_2] 
Moving now to the consequences of over-indebtedness; poverty growth is remarkable both for experts 
(5.75) and individuals (5.98). Decline in welfare is 5.87 for experts and 5.31 for individuals. Differences are not 
statistically significant. However, differences in the opinions of experts and individuals are clear on the effect on 
the financial industry, especially on the way how financial services are offered: for experts the average is 5.48 
and 4.74 for individuals. Differences were statistically significant. Experts warn of the loss of confidence in the 
financial industry (5.52) facing individuals (4.97), and differences were statistically significant. Experts highlight 
the deterioration of the mental health of borrowers (5.18) facing individuals (4.30). Differences were statistically 
significant. Deterioration of borrower welfare is more important for experts (5.87) than for individuals (5.31). 
Differences were statistically significant. Individuals are worried by the deterioration of basic daily aspects such 
as food or clothes (5.18) in a higher measure than experts (4.31). Differences were statistically significant. 
A logistic regression analysis was conducted to test if there are global differences between individuals and 
experts’ opinions. The regression takes as independent variables both causes and consequences. The dependent 
variable is a dummy variable that takes a 1 for experts and 0 for individuals. A test of the full model against a 
constant-only model was statistically significant, indicating that the predictors as a set reliably distinguished 
between experts and individuals (Chi square = 24.096, p<0.000 with df = 2). Nagelkerke’s R
2
 of 0.737 indicated 
a moderately strong relationship between prediction and grouping. Prediction success overall was 90%. Results 
on the discrimination power of each variable were coherent with univariate test results in Table 2. The most 
important differences between experts and individuals opinions are on the effect of economic crisis and on the 
pressure of financial institutions for giving loans to everyone. Both causes were previously identified as very 
important for individuals, and not so important for experts. 
With the aim of understanding the analysis better, a Bi-Plot principal components analysis and a cluster 
analysis were conducted. Both analyses were performed independently: one for the causes and another one for 
the consequences. The robustness of the results of the data was assured by a bootstrap procedure applied to the 
component loadings. Additionally, several clustering algorithms were performed and results were very similar. 
Figure 2 represents the two principal components with Bi-Plot and also shows a dendrogram for the causes. The 
Bi-Plot allows information on both respondent and questions. Experts are represented as points, individuals are 
represented as crosses, while variables are displayed either as vectors. The first principal component accounts for 
32.37% of the variance, and the second principal component accounts for 18.28%. All the Bi-Plot vectors point 
out to the right, towards the first principal component, that is, all of them are over-indebtedness causes. The 
differences arise in the second principal component: the “circumstances” are on the top while the “me” is at the 
bottom, coherently with the proposed model. Figure 2 visualizes the differences between experts and individuals. 
Individuals are salient in the second principal component, in variables such as the crisis effect, the country 
unbalances, the financial institutions’ pressure, and the unemployment. Experts, by contrast, are situated at the 
bottom, where variables such as financial literacy or attitudes facing debt point downwards. These results are 
coherent with the previous results by the means test. These results are also confirmed by the dendrogram 
obtained by the cluster analysis. Two groups of variables are clearly appreciated: a first cluster with the 
circumstances-related causes (external, internal and financial institutions’ pressure) and a second cluster 
including the individual-related causes. 
[Figure 2] 
Figure 3 shows the results of analyzing the consequences. The first principal component explains 43.87% 
of the variance, while the second principal component explains just a 9.48%. The borrower related consequences 
are salient in the second principal component, whose vectors point towards the top; while the lender and society 
related consequences point towards the bottom. Not so many differences arise between experts and individuals. 
The dendrogram visualized the three clusters of consequences: borrower, financial sector and the whole society.  
[Figure 3] 
A canonical correlation analysis was conducted using the 18 cause’s variables as predictors of the 18 
consequence’s variables to evaluate the multivariate shared relationship between the two variable sets. Table 3 
shows the results. Four multivariate statistics (Pillai’s trace, Wilks’ lambda, Hotellings, and Roys) were 
performed to test the null hypothesis that the canonical correlations are zero. The full model across all functions 
was statistically significant according the four criteria, but only Wilks’ lambda results were reported. 
Collectively, the full model across all functions was statistically significant using the Wilks’s λ = 0.010 criterion, 
F(324, 1148.65) = 1.558, p<0.001. Because Wilks’s λ represents the variance unexplained by the model, 1 – λ 
yields the full model effect size in an r
2
 metric. Thus, for the set of 18 canonical functions, the r
2
 type effect size 
was 0.99. The two first canonical functions present eigenvalues higher than one, explaining a 24.51% and a 
16.41% of the variance, respectively. In all, a 40.92% of the variance is explained. Squared canonical 
correlations (
) for the two first function is 0.602, and 0.503 respectively. 
[Table 3] 
These results confirm the relationship between the causes and consequences, and are coherent with 
previous studies. To measure the contribution of each variable to the model, the canonical communality 
coefficient (h2) has been calculated. It is the proportion of variance in each variable that is explained by the 
canonical functions that are relevant. The causal variables with a high explanatory power are the external 
circumstances, such as the growth in the country’s unemployment (h= 54.18%), the economic crisis (h= 
48.24%), and the pressure by loan officers (h= 35.09%). The consequences that contributed more to the model 
are the borrower’s low self-esteem (h= 37.59%), the loss of reputation for financial institutions (h= 54.62%) 
and the loss of trust in the financial industry (h= 45.78%). 
Once the causes and consequences are identified, some policy recommendations can be drawn. A possible 
field is financial sector regulation. Dewatripont and Tirole (2012) analyze banking regulation in the presence of 
macroeconomic shocks, and affirm that policies are needed to validate managerial choices following good 
performance, while bad banking practices should be punished. In fact, some restructured Spanish banks accused of 
malpractice are still running. These regulatory changes should be accompanied by a set of incentives for loan officers, 
not based on the amount of loans allocated, but on the risk of these loans. These incentives should also include training 
to determine more precisely the borrower’s repayment capacity. Strict limits on the maximum debt amount per 
borrower should be implemented, as well as clear rules for loan renewals. Experts’ opinions suggest that borrowers’ 
financial literacy should be improved and a cultural change would also be desirable to reduce the society materialism. 
With this aim, banking supervisors should monitor aggressive banking practices, as well as banking marketing 
campaigns. A gap between experts’ and individuals’ opinions exists and politic parties should be able to understand 
individuals’ perceptions to meet voters. Finally, social financial institutions in developed countries should have a more 
relevant role, since they are now for a minority.   
One of the study’s limitations is that it relies on the sample size. The data analyzed in this study were collected 
without random selection. This study is working with perception-based data, which is less reliable in general than 
observable measures of the same constructs. 
4 Conclusions 
Over-indebtedness is a serious problem, with negative effects in borrowers, financial institutions and 
society. Its causes are explained with theories mixing the rationale inspired by economic theory, such as the Life-
Cycle-Permanent Income theory, with the behavioral inspired by psychology, such as the Projection Bias theory. 
This paper presents an over-indebtedness explanatory model which includes its causes and consequences, rooting 
in both rationalism and behaviorism. There is a continual interaction between the individual consumer and the 
person’s circumstances, in such a way that each personal life results from an interaction between both factors. 
The causes analyzed are borrower aspects such as his propensity to indebtedness and his lack of financial 
literacy. It also includes as causes the borrower circumstances, such as adverse external shocks, borrower 
internal problems and the pressure of the financial industry. The model analyzes over-indebtedness 
consequences in the borrower, the lender and the society.  
To test the model, a survey has been performed to both individuals and experts. The survey is based in 
Spain, a country who has suffered an important crisis based on a mortgage bubble. The technique used to 
analyze the data has been a means test to allow detecting differences between individuals and experts, as well as 
a logistic regression. A multivariate analysis using Bi-Plot principal components analysis and cluster analysis 
has enabled to have a global perspective of all the variables. Finally, the model has been estimated by means of 
canonical correlation analysis, because this technique can deal with a set of independent variables –causes- and a 
set of dependent variables –consequences-.  
There are statistically significant differences between individuals and experts’ opinions. The most 
important factors for individuals are their circumstances: external adverse shocks such as the economic crisis, 
internal adverse shocks such as unemployment, and financial institutions’ pressure. By contrast, experts tend to 
blame the lack of financial literacy among individuals and the tendency to imitate others in their materialistic 
goals. It can be interpreted that, assuming than experts’ opinions are well rooted, individuals are not consistently 
assuming their part of the responsibility. As for over-indebtedness consequences, both individuals and experts 
agree and rank high poverty growth and decline in welfare. Differences arise on the effect on the financial 
industry: experts warn of the loss of confidence in the financial industry. Individuals are concerned by the 
deterioration of basic daily consumption. 
Some policy recommendations arise from the study in the fields of regulation and financial literacy. 
Changes in regulation would be necessary to support good banking practices, punishing malpractices which 
induce over-indebtedness. Finally, if the financial literacy of the population is improved, they will have more 
chances of dealing with over-indebtedness. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of the first function in a canonical correlation analysis with five predictors –





























ShokExt-1 Economic crisis 
ShokExt-2 Country financial unbalances 
ShokExt-3 Country unemployment 
Internal 
adverse shocks 
ShokInt-1 Lowered income due to negative personal circumstances, such as divorce or illness 
ShokInt-2 Unexpected expenses in car, house, children 




PresBank-1 Financial institutions pressure for loan allocation 
PresBank-2 Financial institutions pressure for growing 
PresBank-3 Loan officers pressure to sell financial products 
Financial 
illiteracy 
Literacy-1 Borrower’s low financial literacy 
Literacy-2 Borrower’s low financial management skills  
Literacy-3 Borrower’s lack of experience in financial issues 
Propensity to 
indebtedness 
ProDebt-1 Borrower’s materialism 
ProDebt-2  Borrower’s attitude towards lending risk  
ProDebt-3 Borrower’s tendency to imitate others 
ProDebt-4 Society’s materialism 
ProDebt-5 Social support for debt, that is now considered acceptable 
ProDebt-6 Society encourages to have goods, to own a business or to be successful  
Borrower 
material and  
psychological 
consequences 
BorCon-1 Deterioration of basic daily aspects such as diet, clothes or utility consumption 
BorCon-2 Borrower higher workload, overtime or the need to work when being ill 
BorCon-3 Drop in the borrower’s standard of living 
BorCon-4 Deterioration in the borrower’s mental health 
BorCon-5 Deterioration in the borrower’s welfare 





LendCon-1 Deterioration in financial institutions solvency 
LendCon-2 Higher costs borne by financial institutions due to write-offs 
LendCon-3 Drop in loan demand 
LendCon-4 Loss of reputation in financial institutions 
LendCon-5 Financial industry is not doing its job well any more   





SocCon-1 Poverty growth 
SocCon-2 Higher costs of public services (health, labor, social protection, or public security) 
SocCon-3 Economic decline, implying less income for public bodies 
SocCon-4 Lowered social cohesion and social ties eroded 
SocCon-5 Loss of trust in the financial industry 








Table 2. Exploratory study. The last column shows the results of a means test testing differences 





(N=61) T-test, sig 
Mean St dev Mean St dev 
External adverse shocks ShokExt-1 3.56 1.89 6.03 1.63 7.734
***
 
ShokExt-2 3.74 1.87 6.03 1.49 7.489
***
 
ShokExt-3 4.46 2.01 5.93 1.76 4.31
***
 
Internal adverse shocks ShokInt-1 4.46 1.78 3.90 2.23 -1.522 
ShokInt-2 3.84 1.79 3.51 2.10 -0.927 
ShokInt-3 5.02 1.75 5.74 1.84 2.219
**
 
Financial institutions’ pressure PresBank-1 4.10 1.87 5.82 1.49 5.628
***
 
PresBank-2 4.97 1.79 5.46 1.86 1.489 
PresBank-3 5.21 1.58 5.23 2.00 0.05 
Financial illiteracy Literacy-1 5.39 1.67 4.80 2.02 -1.759
*
 
Literacy-2 5.07 1.60 4.05 2.25 -2.871
***
 
Literacy-3 5.18 1.55 4.54 2.28 -1.807
*
 
Propensity to indebtedness ProDebt-1 4.62 1.65 4.25 2.17 -1.081 
ProDebt-2  5.56 1.51 5.25 1.89 -1.004 
ProDebt-3 4.72 1.80 4.38 2.07 -0.979 
ProDebt-4 4.95 1.79 4.75 2.05 -0.565 
ProDebt-5 4.72 1.76 4.77 2.07 0.141 




and psychological consequences 
BorCon-1 4.31 1.72 5.18 2.10 2.5
**
 
BorCon-2 4.92 1.44 4.48 2.26 -1.292 
BorCon-3 5.44 1.52 5.52 1.92 0.261 
BorCon-4 5.18 1.60 4.30 2.39 -2.405
**
 
BorCon-5 5.87 1.32 5.31 2.02 -1.802
*
 
BorCon-6 4.85 1.45 4.41 2.34 -1.256 
Lender financial and intangible consequences LendCon-1 4.67 1.69 4.26 2.37 -1.099 
LendCon-2 5.08 1.63 4.90 2.35 -0.493 
LendCon-3 4.64 1.69 4.11 2.46 -1.373 
LendCon-4 4.79 1.68 4.26 2.42 -1.389 
LendCon-5 5.48 1.70 4.74 2.21 -2.070
**
 
LendCon-6 4.48 1.84 4.08 2.25 -1.058 
Society economic and cohesion consequences SocCon-1 5.75 1.35 5.98 1.82 0.791 
SocCon-2 4.54 1.86 4.85 2.26 0.832 
SocCon-3 4.95 1.71 5.25 1.78 0.935 
SocCon-4 4.90 1.62 4.90 2.00 0.0 
SocCon-5 5.52 1.48 4.97 2.14 -1.671
*
 
SocCon-6 5.03 1.85 5.25 2.01 0.608 
-
 Economic crisis 
Country unbalances 
Country unemployment 
Loss of job 
Lowered income 
Unexpected expenses 
Banks pressure grow 
Loan officers pressure 
Banks pressure loan 
Low financial literacy 
Low financial skills 
Lack of experience 
Society’s materialism 
Social support for debt 
Society encourages 
Tendency to imitate 
Attitude towards risk 
Borrower’s materialism 





























Banks pressure on loan allocation




Social support for debt
Borrower's low literacy
Borrower's materialism
Borrower's tendency to imitate
Borrowers attitude towards risk
Society's ,materialism
Society encourages to be successul
Borrowers lack of experience
Borrower's lack of skills




Deterioration of basic daily 
Drop standard of living 
Higher costs of public services 




Lowered social cohesion 
Deterioration of banks solvency 
Loss of reputation in banks 
Motivation loss bank employees 
Drop in loan demand 
Higher costs borne by banks 
Banks are not doing its job well 
























Banks' loss of reputation
Higher workload
Deterioration in banks's solvency
Lost of trust in banks
Deterioriation of diet or clothes
Drop in the standard of living
Poverty growth
Deterioration in mental health
Higher costs of public services
Drop in loan demand
Deterioration in welfare
Lower self-esteem
Lack of motivation bank staff
Economic decline
Banks are not doing well its job
Higher costs of write-offs
Lowered social cohesion
Credit crunch
Table 3. Canonical solution for causes and consequences of over-indebtedness, for Functions 1 and 2. 
Coef = standardized canonical function coefficient;  = structure coefficient; 
	 = squared structure 
coefficient; h
2
 = communality coefficient.
Function 1 Function 2 
h
2
 (%) Coef.  
	 (%) Coef.  
	 (%) 
External adverse shocks 
ShokExt-1 0.310 0.635 40.37% -0.601 -0.280 7.86% 48.24% 
ShokExt-2 0.046 0.437 19.12% 0.958 0.137 1.88% 21.00% 
ShokExt-3 0.412 0.596 35.57% -0.514 -0.431 18.61% 54.18% 
Internal adverse shocks 
ShokInt-1 -0.233 -0.119 1.41% -0.119 -0.388 15.08% 16.50% 
ShokInt-2 -0.238 -0.114 1.29% 0.076 -0.342 11.71% 13.00% 
ShokInt-3 0.068 0.234 5.47% -0.019 -0.387 14.95% 20.42% 
Banks’ pressure 
PresBank-1 0.291 0.200 3.99% 0.117 -0.015 0.02% 4.01% 
PresBank-2 -0.050 -0.137 1.86% 0.170 -0.047 0.22% 2.09% 
PresBank-3 -0.714 -0.455 20.66% -0.582 -0.380 14.43% 35.09% 
Lack of financial literacy 
Literacy-1 0.216 -0.190 3.59% 0.237 -0.176 3.09% 6.68% 
Literacy-2 -0.252 -0.358 12.81% 0.080 -0.266 7.08% 19.89% 
Literacy-3 0.026 -0.324 10.51% -0.356 -0.305 9.31% 19.82% 
Propensity to indebtedness 
ProDebt-1 -0.116 0.004 0.00% 0.029 -0.230 5.27% 5.27% 
ProDebt-2 0.150 -0.082 0.67% 0.246 -0.055 0.30% 0.98% 
ProDebt-3 0.066 -0.088 0.77% 0.116 -0.348 12.13% 12.90% 
ProDebt-4 0.277 0.114 1.31% -0.399 -0.450 20.21% 21.52% 
ProDebt-5 0.161 0.125 1.55% -0.015 -0.327 10.70% 12.26% 
ProDebt-6 -0.013 -0.200 4.00% -0.198 -0.355 12.59% 16.59% 
Borrower consequences 
BorCon-1 0.585 0.338 11.43% 0.262 -0.107 1.13% 12.56% 
BorCon-2 -0.348 -0.238 5.66% -0.056 -0.462 21.31% 26.97% 
BorCon-3 0.385 0.130 1.68% -0.449 -0.437 19.07% 20.75% 
BorCon-4 -0.793 -0.322 10.37% 0.349 -0.331 10.99% 21.36% 
BorCon-5 -0.040 -0.154 2.36% 0.233 -0.319 10.15% 12.51% 
BorCon-6 0.189 -0.198 3.91% -0.559 -0.580 33.68% 37.59% 
Lender consequences 
LendCon-1 -0.382 -0.196 3.82% 0.410 -0.466 21.71% 25.53% 
LendCon-2 0.120 0.025 0.06% 0.048 -0.291 8.44% 8.51% 
LendCon-3 0.069 -0.125 1.55% -0.184 -0.493 24.33% 25.88% 
LendCon-4 0.390 -0.187 3.48% -0.768 -0.715 51.14% 54.62% 
LendCon-5 -0.268 -0.247 6.11% 0.217 -0.295 8.70% 14.82% 
LendCon-6 0.157 -0.210 4.42% -0.061 -0.559 31.21% 35.63% 
Society consequences 
SocCon-1 0.545 0.327 10.70% -0.048 -0.368 13.54% 24.24% 
SocCon-2 0.058 0.108 1.17% -0.047 -0.337 11.33% 12.50% 
SocCon-3 0.203 0.015 0.02% -0.463 -0.633 40.04% 40.06% 
SocCon-4 -0.227 -0.190 3.61% 0.161 -0.475 22.52% 26.13% 
SocCon-5 -0.371 -0.368 13.56% 0.010 -0.568 32.22% 45.78% 
SocCon-6 -0.210 -0.233 5.43% -0.041 -0.536 28.73% 34.16% 


	 60.18% 50.30% 
